Three Student Essays on Demographic Change and Migration

by Aurore Flipo, Hélène Derieux and Janna Miletzki

No. 2009/1
Three Student Essays on Demographic Change and Migration

by Aurore Flipo, Hélène Derieux and Janna Miletzki

The WDA-HSG Letters on Demographic Issues

No. 2009/1

MANAGING EDITORS:

Monika BÜTLER Professor, University of St.Gallen, Switzerland
Ilona KICKBUSCH Professor, The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland
Alfonso SOUSA-POZA Delegate of the Board, World Demographic Association, Switzerland
          Professor, University of Hohenheim-Stuttgart, Germany

ADVISORY BOARD OF THE WORLD DEMOGRAPHIC ASSOCIATION:

Marcel F. BISCHOF Founder of WDA, Spain
Richard BLEWITT CEO, HelpAge International, UK
David E. BLOOM Clarence James Gamble Professor of Economics and Demography, Harvard University, USA
Robert BUTLER CEO and President, ILC, USA
Joseph COUGHLIN Professor and Director AgeLab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), USA
Monica FERREIRA Director, International Longevity Centre-South Africa, University of Cape Town, South Africa
Oliver GASSMANN Professor of Technology Management, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
Peter GOMEZ Chairman of the Board, Swiss Exchange (SWX), Switzerland
Melinda HANISCH Director, Policy – Europe, Middle East, Africa and Canada, Merck & Co., Inc., USA
Werner HAUG Director, Technical Division, United Nations Population Fund, New York
Dalmer HOSKINS Director, Office of Policy Development and Liaison for Public Trustees, US Social Security Administration, USA
Alexandre KALACHE Head, International Centre for Policies on Ageing, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Ursula LEHR Former German Minister of Health and Family, and founding Director of the German Centre for Research on Ageing, Germany
          OECD Director for Employment, Labour & Social Affairs, Paris
John P. MARTIN Professor and Director, Department of Geriatrics of the University Hospitals of Geneva, Switzerland
Jean-Pierre MICHEL Head of Research and Development, Erste Bank der Oesterreichischen Sparkassen AG, Austria
Hiroyuki MURATA President, Social Development Research Centre, Japan
Alexandre SIDORENKO Head, UN Focal Point on Ageing, New York
Alan WALKER Professor and Director of ERA-AGE, University of Sheffield, UK
Erich WALSER Chairman of the Board of the Helvetia Group, Switzerland

Main partners of the World Demographic Association are:

Helvetia Group
Merck & Co., Inc.
University of St.Gallen

This discussion paper series is kindly supported by the Ecoscientia Foundation

The opinions expressed in this article do not represent those of WDA.
Three Student Essays on Demographic Change and Migration

Foreword

Perhaps one of the most controversially discussed topics related to demographic change is the role that migration could or should play in meeting the challenges posed by demographic shifts. As is well known, global demographic shifts are very different across countries and continents and – at least in public discourse – migration is often seen as a possible solution to the different demographic challenges around the globe – especially between developed and less-developed countries.

This was in essence the background for a conference organized at the end of 2008 at the University of St. Gallen in Switzerland by the Convention on International Law and Politics (CILP) – a conference organized by and for students. Thanks to the generous support from the Ecoscientia Foundation, the World Demographic Association and the University of St. Gallen were able to take this opportunity to launch an essay competition among the approximately 200 international students taking part at this conference. In this publication, the three winning student essays are printed. On behalf of the World Demographic Association, I would like to congratulate the three winners of this competition and also thank the members of the jury and the organizing team at CILP for their valuable support.

Alfonso Sousa-Poza, World Demographic Association
St. Gallen - Switzerland, March 2009
Changing Perspective: Towards a Cosmopolitan Approach of Identity in Europe

By Aurore Flipo
Sciences-Po, Paris

Ever since the first Schengen agreements were signed in 1985, uncontrolled migration has been considered to be one of the dangerous aspects of European integration. Since then, security matters have been intrinsically linked with any policy related to migration and border management. Fear of overwhelming population flow has marked every step of Europe’s expansion, regardless of whether this expansion was geographical (enlargement) or pertaining to competency (skills). Thus it is not by chance that the debate about migration is so acute these days, considering the complex stabilization process Europe has now started to develop.

However, at the same time, the demographics of European society pose serious problems for welfare states. The need for migration was recognized by several economists decades ago and the attempts to create a chosen migration, whether it be national (i.e. French laws on immigration) or at the European level (Pact for Immigration, Blue card) reflects this growing preoccupation.

It is both on economic and security grounds that migration, as a global phenomenon, is perceived by European policies. The concept is strained between an economic definition determined by the idea of flux (clandestine employment, temporary migration, high-skilled migration policies) and a security one determined by the idea of confinement (Dublin convention, readmission agreements, safe-third countries). The traditional definition of the migrant, on the other hand, is culturally determined. A migrant is first of all someone coming from somewhere else, speaking a different language and maybe having different habits: the concepts of integration and foreigners clearly refer to the cultural identity.

These three elements are mediated by the processes of identification: passports and visa policies, citizenship and nationality. The point I would like to develop in this paper is a critical comment on the concept of foreigner, looking back at the State as a producer and distributor of identities. Deconstructing the essentialist vision of nationality by taking support from Ulrich Beck’s theory of cosmopolitism, I will try to
examine how the ‘state monopoly of the means of circulation’ (Torpey, 1998) is actually a state monopoly of the definition of identity, of which the concept of integrating foreigners is a vivid example. Looking at the European ways of defining identity, we will see how they are based on what Ulrich Beck calls a methodological nationalism, denying the plurality of the migration phenomenon and the possibility of multiple identities.

On the other hand, I will attempt to present the idea of cosmopolitism as a consistent alternative to the nation-based model of identity that can provide an effective answer to the hang-ups of the integrative theory, unadapted to tomorrow’s global societies. This is made possible by the fact that the cosmopolitism theory does not exclude the national identity, but rather encompasses it. Taking into account the fact that a state-based model of identity is a social and political construction, it opens the door for other definitions. This way, the migration challenge in Europe can offer a unique occasion to surpass the dead-end street of national identity and lead to an innovative, creative and efficient example of institutionalized cosmopolitism (Beck, 2006).

The State as a producer and distributor of identities

The European Nation-State and the monopoly of the definition of identity

The national identity is not a natural phenomenon and is the result of the successive territorialization of the State that occurred in Europe from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century. Although it is often considered that the State is the ultimate product of the nation, they actually co-constructed each other. Geographic frontiers, passports, identity cards, language unifications and national myths were all produced by the State in order to build up the nation, while the idea of nation structured itself around political demands.

The rise of the Nations in European empires is a complicated phenomenon of political dissemination caused by minority discriminations, and bilateral and hierarchical relationships between the core and the peripheries (see Bunce, 2005). The fact that nationalism was a major cause of the First World War in Europe does not mean that it involved any natural identity, free from political and social construct.
If we look back at what Europe looked like even in the nineteenth century, there is nothing less obvious than the existence of homogeneous nations sharing a pure and unique identity.

Nevertheless, the definition of identity has been used as one of the major tools of the State to build its legitimacy. First, the existence of a common identity is a powerful way of legitimizing political power. The territorialized State needed a territorialized nation to create the consensus on itself – just like it needed the legitimate monopoly of violence. This took the shape of symbolism and imagery: myths, national heroes and institutionalization of a national language to create a national culture. However, it also implied the need for social control, which was gradually developed by the practice of counting and naming: public record offices and, more recently, central statistical offices replaced the registers of the Church. Ethnic statistics clearly raise profound questions all over Europe, showing how much they appear inconsistent with the national State.

On the one hand, the territorialization of the frontier demarcated the land, in which a social corpus was gradually created, and on the other hand, frontiers within the land were gradually eliminated. This way, the concept of foreigner is a concept unified and constructed by the national ideology, legitimized by the State and various institutions (border control, public record offices, etc.). The dichotomy between foreigners and nationals seems indeed very hard to clarify and to justify in the absence of a State.

In some parts of Central Europe, some ethnic groups remain unstated, and the double meaning of the expression to state something is not accidental. To what extent are they foreigners or natives then? The Roma, for instance, tend to be considered foreigners everywhere in Europe, as well as in India from where they are supposed to originate. On the opposite side, the Ruthenians are very often considered as being the ancestral background of Ukrainians by Ukrainians themselves, whereas some Ruthenians do not consider themselves Ukrainians. Some Serbian Ruthenians may feel Ukrainian whereas some Ruthenians of Ukraine might not. Even though the traditional territory of the Ruthenians is Subcarpathia, the Ruthenians that tend to consider themselves the most Ruthenian are the Ruthenians of North America.
Similarly, what can the essentialist vision of nationality say about national minorities that live on the border areas of their ‘own’ State’s neighbour? Where is the Hungarian of Slovakia more native? Where is he more of a foreigner?

These simple examples, which can be almost infinitely replicated, show that the adequacy between territory and identity as people feel it is not clear and dialectic. The only clear distinction between nationals and foreigners is the one established by the national State, made possible by the monopoly of the means of circulation: ‘by this process, individuals have also became dependent on the State to acquire an "identity " from which they cannot part with and that can sensibly condition their access to different spaces’ (Torpey, 1998).

The frontiers themselves, without which the territorialization of the State and the construction of the national identity seem impossible, are neither unambiguous nor linear. On the contrary, the instability of frontiers at a global level shows how much they are contextual and not natural: ‘the collapse of the USSR produced by itself 45 millions foreigners’ (Bernard, 2002). Neither essential nor senseless, the frontiers are part of the co-construction process of identity: ‘what frontiers are, what they represent, is constantly constituted by human beings that are regulated, influenced and limited by those same frontiers’ (Anderson, 1997).

Considering identity to be unique and exclusive, defining it through the political institutions of identification and distribution of circulation rights is making a ‘carceral error of identity’ (Beck, 2006). That does not mean nation or national identity does not exist; however, taking into account the national State as a producer and a distributor of identities, in ways and for purposes that can considerably vary in history, gives the analyst a considerable set of variables demonstrating that in the way people perceive and experience their own identity, the national one is not monopolistic nor unambiguous. Similarly, strictly considering frontiers as spaces of differentiation and opposition is making a huge mistake. They are ‘barriers’ as well as ‘resources, streams’ (Wihtol de Wenden, 2004), and a local transnational (or non-national) identity can appear in border areas.
Integration, identity and citizenship

If the State monopoly of circulation is guaranteed by law, the State monopoly of identity is in practice challenged by numerous instances of self-definition: language, habits, cultural references, import and export of various elements from out-groups, construction of references to commonly chosen ancestors. There is a contradiction between the political monopoly of identity and the actual identity of individuals and the way they perceive it.

The confusion occurs when the particular State, convinced as being the only displayer of identity, uses this identity as a parameter for citizenship, and a condition for having access to certain categories of rights. This way, identity starts to be a passport for citizenship, undermining the universal concept of citizenship based on law.

In the Enlightenment theory of citizenship, citizens are to be equal and indistinguishable before the law. Further developments to the theory of justice, as conceptualized by the English thinkers, consider law as the basis of society, and the essential cement for peaceful cohabitation of social groups. The theory that is understated in the conception of citizenship such as the French one is as follows: the State must be blind to differences in order to guarantee equal and impartial treatment. This concept is often used to explain the necessity of integration: differences create inequalities, and that is why different people should integrate (meaning: not look different). However, the argument is fallacious, because here the State is both judge and party. A producer of identity cannot claim to be blind to identity differences.

By the manner of integration, the State is actually proceeding to a form of identity selection where only one option is available. The supposed blindness of the State towards differences is actually a selective one: ‘in the countries dominated by White people, the fact of being white represents the privilege of not noticing that you are white’ (Beck, 2006).

Moreover, the argument underestimates the historical context of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment concept of citizenship was universal: it was designed to adapt to any society where all individuals would eventually be similar.
Universalists dreamt of a world without cultural differences and without ethnic groups, which they considered archaic. Ulrich Beck points out that this version of cosmopolitanism is no longer tolerable in a post-Auschwitz Europe. The ideology of the universal man proves its limits when eliminating the differences means eliminating physically the non-conforming individuals.

Thus, the idea of neutral citizenship dies with the Nation-State. Displaying nationality and citizenship, the law can no longer claim to be neutral. The result is that nationality and citizenship are intrinsically bound, and the set of rights citizenship provides is conditioned by nationality. Nationality is a passport for citizenship: very rare are the natives that are denied their citizenship. However, in the case of migration, full citizenship without nationality is very difficult. Non-native people can work in a country, pay taxes, rent a house, put their children into public schools and listen to them reciting the national history, and at best they will have a reduced kind of citizenship (a permit of residence), at worst they will be denied any right. The amalgam of identity and citizenship is precisely the ideology of integration, creating an exclusive definition of citizenship that expels some social groups from the common law on the basis of their non-conformity to the ideal of nationality.

The methodological nationalism is criticized by Beck for being stuck in an exclusive definition of identity: either / or; whereas cosmopolitanism offers an additive definition of identity: and / and. The issue of integration reflects this paradox: integration refers to the change of identity, the substitution from one to the other, where one is considered more legitimate than the other. On the one hand, the migrant must feel French, German or English; on the other hand, the natives must do as if the migrant would correspond to the “territorial ontology” (Beck, 2006) that defines the German or French identity as White and Christian.

‘The duality of native and foreigner’ (Beck, 2006) operated by the national state is based on an implicit identity hierarchy and is not suitable to the reality. It artificially masks the plurality of identities everyone experiences everyday; both local and global, both from here and from somewhere else. The European Union opened a breach in the nationalist conception of citizenship. However, instead of moving towards a cosmopolitan vision of identity and a neutral citizenship, Nation-States
seem to be keener on going back to a nationalist glorification of identity. The assimilation of national identity and immigration in the same ministry in France is one of the examples of such a temptation. However, the growing possibilities of daily cosmopolitanism people experience in their everyday lives shows how much the gap between the idealized State monopoly of identity and actual plurality of identities is conflicting.

**Is Europe stuck in nationalist identity?**

*Truman’s doctrine and its offspring: the ‘Huntington anguish’*

Since the rise of the Nations led to the constitution of ethnically homogeneous (sometimes obtained by ethnic cleansing) States that always seek to match their ‘cultural’ frontiers with their administrative ones, identity has been absorbed by citizenship. The universalist conception of citizenship has been buried beneath so-called ethnic wars, and resulted in what Beck calls the Huntington’s anguish, referring to the famous theory of the ‘clash of civilizations’: *‘the fear that ethnic differences could never be overcome, and that without national assimilation, without the national abolition of difference, the chaos being brewing under the surface would explode’* (Beck, 2006).

To support Huntington’s prophecy, it is often argued that multicultural empires gave birth to the First World War, and it is thus a matter of global security to make sure every nation has its own state, in compliance with Truman’s doctrine. If this assumption is true, in a sense, it nevertheless conceals a substantial number of interactions and strategies that make identity appear more as a political tool than as a natural fact. The essentialist definition of nationality undermines the actual constellation of identities political forces compose, decompose and recompose over time (see Torpey, 1998). Moreover, the idea of a global peace ensured by ethnically homogeneous States closed by hermetic frontiers could be qualified as idealistic as the Universalist world without differences or frontiers.

The conflicting power of identity actually lies in its exclusive definition that allows, as we explained earlier in this paper, its instrumentalization for the purpose of economic, social and political hierarchy. If we look closer at what we sometimes refer
to as ‘ethnic’ conflicts, we often see economic, social and political discrimination that does not result from ethnicity, but uses it. If the Nation-State is supposed to avoid such problems, it actually reproduces it just by changing the words, replacing ‘national’ by ‘ethnic’, ‘minority’ or ‘foreign background’. Pretending not to see the differences, it only tacitly confirms the supremacy of the legitimate definition of identity.

The theory of cosmopolitism offers an innovative perspective in the sense that it suggests a concept of identity that is neither universalist nor nationalist, but takes from both concepts of citizenship and identity: equality and difference. If we consider that no hierarchy exists between different identities, it is thus possible to envisage difference as not leading to inequality and being legitimate, surpassing the supposed ‘blindness’ of the law.

**Actual cosmopolitanism and institutionalized cosmopolitism**

Non-nationalist conceptions of identity actually already exist within Europe. In some cases, it has been recognized that the homogeneous and unique identity in the national frame was not effective. This is the case of the convention on protection of minorities. There, it is considered right and legitimate to allow national minorities to get citizenship in the country they live in, without losing their difference. However, the concept of national minority sticks to an essentialist definition of identity, linked with a territory and considered as residual.

The necessity to elaborate a cosmopolitan definition of identity in Europe is rendered obvious with the case of migration. Migration does not fit into the essentialist national identity, whatever substitute States use to try to make them fit in, notably integration. Instead, migration is a daily practice of cosmopolitism.

The massive migration of Polish citizens to England since 2004 is an example of daily cosmopolitism. The Polish created their own structures: Polish restaurants, pubs and food are now easy to find all over the United Kingdom, and their clients are not exclusively Poles. However, they also used British structures, even some that had been abandoned by the British themselves (namely churches). Now that Polish citizens are returning to Poland, it will be quite interesting to see how the cultural
marks of Poland evolve in the United Kingdom. At the same time, Poland is becoming an immigration country while being an emigration one. The same phenomenon occurred in the Czech Republic and Romania. The nation-based definition of identity has to change when a substantial part of the native population is beyond its frontiers, and a part of the population inside the frontiers is not native. The traditional dichotomy between native and foreigner is clearly surpassed here.

The main difference between earlier migrations, that used public space and exchanged goods and traditions with ‘locals’ exactly like Poles did in the United Kingdom, is that the legal framework of the European Union made, in this case, the idea of integration beside the point. This is possible only because the European framework deprived the State of the possibility of imposing an identity on Polish citizens. Neither total foreigners nor natives, they were part of the European common space.

Polish immigration in the United Kingdom provides an example of an open gap for cosmopolitanism. However, until now we have only be able to qualify them by the negative: neither foreigners nor natives. The additive conception of identity cosmopolitanism suggests going beyond the no-no that results from the inadequacy of national frameworks.

Here lies the difference between the daily cosmopolitanism, as these citizens experienced it, and institutionalized cosmopolitanism, that offers a comprehensive legal framework that does not stick to the national-exclusive definition of identity. Changing perspective on the concept of identity is a first step towards the institutionalization of cosmopolitanism, yet this alone is not sufficient if law and institutions do not change as well.

**Conclusion: Challenges for a cosmopolitan Europe with regards to migration**

The consequences of such a change of perspective are multiple. Nationality and the integration ideology are part of the nation-based concept of identity, but other spheres of the social area need to be redefined in order to overcome the native / foreigner dichotomy.

The major challenge is linked with the labour market, because the socio-
economic position coming from labour is another major determinant of identity. Since the second half of the twentieth century, citizenship has been more and more clearly associated with labour and its compensation, social welfare. Following the theory of justice as a social contract, the Welfare State, institutionalized embodiment of social justice, is nowadays the main cement of European societies. Changing perspectives on nationality without changing perspective on labour and welfare policies is thus missing half of the determinants of identity allocation. This is particularly true for migration, and the thematic of this essay is clear on this point: migration is doubly linked with the Welfare State. First, because it is work migration we are talking about. Although labour is the main attribute of such migrations, migrants are often under-represented in the social welfare system. Second, because the wager of the demographic decline is the viability of the Welfare State.

Changing the perspective about the concept of identity, one of the major challenges of the European Union will then be to introduce cosmopolitism into comprehensive and consistent labour and welfare policies. Following Beck’s theory of risk, we could imagine considering welfare as a common good to manage, and poverty/unemployment as a global risk to cope with, cosmopolitism is likely to bring new possibilities into the debate.

References
The failure of the European Blue Card demonstrates countries’ lack of understanding of the ageing and the immigration issues

By Hélène Derieux
ESCP-EAP European School of Management

Introduction

Three years after the idea was officially introduced, European countries seem to have reached a consensus on the European Blue Card, which could lead to its adoption at the end of November 2008 with enforcement expected in 2011. Henceforth, it seems that the term ‘failure’ needs to be qualified as it rather refers to tough negotiations and opposition from politicians in certain EU member countries, such as Germany, than to an actual rejection of the Blue Card.

The Blue Card would grant immigrants qualifying for highly skilled employment in a member State a four-year work and residence permit. The opportunity to move to another EU member state would remain open after two years spent in the original host country. Immigrants qualifying for the European Blue Card would then be entitled to a series of socio-economic rights and would benefit from conditions favourable to family reunification.

The card is regarded as a move related to the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs the aim of which is to increase the competitiveness of the European Union. As such, it promotes a highly selective immigration inspired by the famous US Green Card. However, it remains quite different from it, mainly since it does not involve permanent residence as does the US Green Card. What is more, EU member states will remain free to decide how many skilled immigrants they will host and to operate a selection among immigrants according to their sector of activity, which was a sine qua non condition for reaching consensus among European member states.

When it comes to determining how far the ‘failure’ (this term needs to be qualified as it has previously been mentioned) of the European Blue Card could demonstrate countries’ lack of understanding of the ageing and immigration issues, three approaches are considered:

---

1 ‘Highly qualified employment’ is to be understood as ‘the exercise of work as a worker for which higher education qualifications or higher professional competences are required’, as stated in Ewa Klamt’s Report on the proposal for a Council directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment (European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 2008).
It can be argued that opposition to the European Blue Card demonstrates countries’ reluctance to consider immigration and ageing issues at a European level, which would indeed be a form of misunderstanding of these issues; if one holds that they are to be considered at a European level, that is.

The European Blue Card is actually not meant to be a solution to the ageing and immigration issues in the long term; the key idea that lies behind the Blue Card is European competitiveness. Thus, opposition to the card demonstrates a lack of understanding of these two issues as they relate to the European competitiveness challenge.

It should actually also be considered that even if the Blue Card was successfully implemented, the understanding and tackling of immigration as a global issue would still remain a difficult point to manage for EU countries. Indeed, the brain drain is a double-edged sword that fosters competitiveness of the EU but also worsens illegal immigration at its borders and tarnishes human resources in developing countries.

EU Countries’ opposition to the Blue Card as it relates to reluctance to consider immigration and ageing issues at a European level: a form of misunderstanding of those issues?

Europe is not the ‘United States of Europe’, as the French writer, poet and politician Victor Hugo once dreamed it could be. There is definitely reluctance in many European countries, such as Germany, to consider ageing and immigration issues at a European level. However, in a globalised world where giants such as China and India operate, is it realistic to consider that a European country can fight and be competitive on its own?

Ewa Klamt, the rapporteur of the Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment carefully specifies:

‘The subsidiarity principle must be maintained: at EU level, there is no European labour market, and there are no integrated social security schemes, no common arrangements for old-age provision and no harmonised health insurance schemes’.  

---

2 Ewa Klamt’s Report on the proposal for a Council directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment (European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 2008).
Ageing and immigration as national or as European issues: the compromise of a flexible demand-driven Blue Card.

If we consider France and Germany’s attitudes, countries that are historically European ‘locomotives’, it is tempting to reach the conclusion that it is currently not politically possible for them to invest in EU-wide solutions. Indeed, the ‘great coalition’ government in Germany insists that economic migration is a question of national sovereignty and considers that it would make more sense anyway to utilise the unemployed workforce to tackle the lack of skilled workers. And in times of financial crisis when unemployment is likely to increase, it would not really be diplomatic openly to call for immigration to ‘take Germans jobs’. In France, the newly elected President Nicholas Sarkozy partly based his winning electoral campaign on the idea of a selective immigration with limited family reunification possibilities. The underlying idea is that immigration has to be ‘chosen’ not endured. This ‘immigration choisie’ or ‘chosen immigration’ is too much a key point of the French President’s communication strategy to enable him to give the impression that he would submit to any European directive on this particular point.

Thus, a compromise has been possible under the condition that the Blue Card should be very flexible and demand-driven, which is consistent, for instance, with this French ‘chosen immigration’ policy.

This Directive should provide for a flexible demand-driven entry system driven by Member State demand, based on objective criteria such as a minimum salary threshold comparable with the wage levels in the Member States and on professional qualifications.

Member States should fix their national threshold accordingly to the situation of their respective labour markets and their general immigration policies.

However, a certain degree of harmonisation will be required. The definition of a common minimum denominator for the national wage threshold is required otherwise admission conditions would display too many discrepancies between EU member countries.

---

3 A strategy that identifies him as the only one being able to handle the problems in certain French suburbs due to second- or third-generation immigrants, and the illegal immigrants flooding French coasts or massing near the English Channel in an attempt to cross it.

4 Ewa Klamt’s Report on the proposal for a Council directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment (European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 2008).

5 At the time being, the threshold is fixed at a minimum of 1.7 times average gross pay under national law.
(b) Countries within the EU developing their own strategies and offering their own ‘Green Cards’.

All European countries have their own economic immigration strategy, yet a consensus has finally been reached on a flexible demand-driven European Blue Card. However, there is actually quite a problem for the Blue Card in that countries within the EU have developed their own ‘Blue Cards’ as recently demonstrated by the cases of Ireland, the UK and the Czech Republic.

The UK has a new points system under which immigrants reaching a 75-point threshold, based primarily on their age, qualifications, salary and proficiency in English, will be welcome in the UK to apply for a job.

(c) Recent enlargements of the EU complicate the issue of defining EU-wide policies.

Recent enlargements of the EU complicate the problem as it has lead to integration of countries with different ageing and immigration issues, thus making coordination even more difficult. Indeed, if ageing is a generalised process in the EU, there are still discrepancies between countries. For instance, according to Eurostat\(^6\), over the entire projection period 2008–2060, the median age is projected to increase up to more than 15 years in the newly integrated Poland and Slovakia, while it is projected to increase up to less than 5 years in countries such as France and Belgium.

Furthermore, there is a possibility that the Blue Card may not actually be implemented before 2011, due to the transitional arrangements limiting the labour mobility of EU citizens from the new Member States, such as the Czech Republic.

(2) Rejecting the Blue Card as a misunderstanding of ageing and immigration issues as they relate to the European competitiveness challenge.

(a) The European Blue Card is not meant to be ‘the’ solution to the ageing and immigration issues in the long term.

According to the Eurostat Convergence scenario for the year 2008, annual deaths are forecast to offset annual births within the EU 27 from 2015. Thus, after a certain point around 2015, migration will be the only source of population growth within the EU. That said,\(^6\)

---

\(^6\) Eurostat, Data in Focus 72-2008: Aging characterises the demographic perspectives of the European societies (Author: Konstantinos Giannakouris).
it is not realistic in the long term to consider that immigration will counterbalance the negative natural change for more than 20 years. Indeed, from 2035, the population change is forecast to drop below zero. What is true for immigration in general is all the more true when it comes to the kind of highly selective and thus lower in volume immigration that would stem from the adoption of the European Blue Card. The Ewa Klamt Report is actually very explicit about this selfsame idea:

‘Immigration for taking up highly qualified employment cannot be a long-term solution to economic problems or to the demographic problem. Admitting highly qualified workers can help to solve those problems in the short term only. In the medium and long term, Member States must take further employment, economic and family policy measures in order to deal with present and future developments in the EU’.\(^7\)

Furthermore, the aim of the Blue Card is to bring in qualified educated people, who are not likely to contribute to any increase in birth rates. Anyway, migrants with a Blue Card are supposed to remain within EU borders for four years, although they may apply for citizenship in the country of their choice, as it is part of the EU’s ethical recruitment and return policies.

\section*{(b) Ageing and immigration issues as they relate to the competitiveness of how the EU can take part in the global race for competitiveness.}

Economic immigration is a challenge that has to be placed in the context of the global race for competitiveness. As stated in the Ewa Klamt report, highly qualified workers from all third countries account for 1.72\% of the European Union’s total workforce, so the EU clearly appears to be lagging behind countries such as Australia (9.9\%) and Canada (7.2\%). What is more, immigration is becoming more and more a parameter to monitor when it comes to competitiveness. Indeed, if, as has been previously explained, ‘migration postpones the onset of population, but cannot reverse this trend’\(^8\), it is still one of the tools at the disposal of governments to tackle the ageing issue. It is also a tool to bridge the gap between people formed in universities and the actual needs that are involved in production levels. The latter use of immigration bears an element of risk as countries might be tempted to neglect the educational challenge and to compensate for it with immigration.

\footnote{7}{Ewa Klamt, Explanatory statement of the Report on the proposal for a Council directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment (European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 2008).}

\footnote{8}{Eipascope 2007-3, Demographic Changes, Immigration Policy and Development in the European Union (Author: Katherina-Marina Kyrieri).}
In 2008, in the EU there were four people of working age\(^9\) for every person aged 65 years or over; in 2060 the ratio is expected to be two to one\(^{10}\). An ageing population is less innovative, which has repercussions on costs and productivity and thus on the ability of a country to attract Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs). Also, pensions and health expenses tend to constitute a burden that puts pressure on the active population and thus curbs consumption. However, it should be borne in mind that ageing will also be a major problem for most of the developed economies and for China and India as well. An ageing population fosters other kinds of elderly-related services and product consumption in which EU firms will also have to invest to compete with, for instance Japanese firms, that have understood the importance of the ‘elderly market’, or ‘silver market’ as it is called in Japan\(^{11}\).

\(3\) Even with a successfully implemented Blue Card, the complex mechanism of global immigration would remain an issue for EU members: the double-edge sword of immigration and the discrepancies between long- and short-term orientated views of the problem.

Economic immigration is even more a challenge for Europe nowadays, which makes being attractive to highly skilled labour one of its top priorities. However, being attractive to highly skilled labour does not occur without also appealing even more to other types of much less qualified, if at all qualified, migrants.

\(a\) The impact of a highly selective EU immigration policy: the risk of fuelling illegal immigration and draining away the reservoir of skills from developing countries.

The core of the problem in this regard is illegal immigration from Africa\(^{12}\), where 17 million of the over 900 million people living there are considered to be ‘migrant stock’ by the United Nations. Not all of these potential migrants will try to enter the EU, but it must be remembered that there are 200 million people living in North Africa, a few hours from the Spanish, French and Italian coasts. People are living under economic, demographic and social

---

\(^9\) This average was computed for the 27 countries. Working age is set at 15 to 64 years old by Eurostat.

\(^{10}\) Eurostat, Data in Focus 72-2008: Aging characterises the demographic perspectives of the European societies (Author: Konstantinos Giannakouris).

\(^{11}\) Interestingly enough, in Japan a significant proportion of consumption is driven by pensioners spending their life savings whereas, until recently at least, the active population preferred to save for the future and the education of their children. This is what economists call the ‘silver market’, which involves many services, such as home-care, remote health-monitoring and elderly-adapted tourism and also products, for example automatic devices to help in the home.

\(^{12}\) Moroccan illegal migrants, detected at the sea borders and at the land border between Spain and Morocco, are the third most detected nationals (after Albanians and Iraqi nationals) according to Frontex’s General Report for the year 2007. According to the report, Egyptian, Algerian, Eritrean and Somali nationals are those most detected at the sea borders.
conditions that foster immigration: high unemployment rates, more than 50% of the population under the age of 17, with a low level of education and access to news. The problem of illegal immigration will worsen accordingly with demographic growth and demographic pressure on economies. There will be even more ‘migrant stock’ within the two billion people who will be living in Africa by 2050.13

It can be very tempting to try a seemingly small yet actually very hazardous crossing of the Mediterranean to seek a better life in Europe, and it seems quite logical that the introduction of the Blue Card will have an effect on this kind of immigration. Indeed, it brings to mind that within the EU it is possible to travel between countries without a visa, and evokes the US Green Card, which is a synonym of having a better life, a misnomer indeed. What is more, its appeal to people who are likely to have success in Europe might also encourage desperate people to follow their example and attempt to leave Africa. The specificity of social structures in those countries, familial networks and small villages with a great deal of word-of-mouth communication plays an important role in this phenomenon. Indeed, a relative leaving for France and finding success there will have an important impact on the social networks to which this migrant belongs. This is one of the channels through which myths about the ‘European dream’14 are established. Thus, the kind of selective immigration policy supported by the Blue Card can have a negative impact on illegal immigration. This is actually all the more true since it might also lead to the draining away of the reservoir of skills of developing countries.

(b) The implementation of the Blue Card confronted with long- and short-term orientated views of the immigration issue.

Talented people leaving developing countries means that developing countries are losing people who have managed to make good, are resourceful and likely to have entrepreneurial attitudes; in other words, exactly the kind of people needed sustainably and transparently15 to develop a country. Of course, losing these people to developing countries worsens the problem of illegal immigration as it prevents developing countries to upgrade living conditions. Plus, an ethical question underlies this problem: do we truly consider people

---

14 African countries in collaboration with their European counterparts increasingly try to demystify this ‘European dream’. In 2007 for instance, adverts were run on Senegalese radio, TV and in newspapers in collaboration with the Spanish government ‘European dream’. These adverts showed, among others, the famous Senegalese musician Youssoun D’our with the motto: ‘Don’t risk your life for nothing’.
15 Corruption is a significant reason for African immigrants leaving their home country. According to Transparency International, a world-wide anti-corruption organisation, many of the sub-Saharan countries rank among the most corrupt countries in the world, the worst of them being Chad (2005
as human resources and operate selection between them treating them only with regard to the economic benefits they can bring to Europe? This would not exactly be the line of thought that presided over the foundation of the EU. Yet, stories of illegal immigrants literally being dumped at sea frequently hit the headlines. This is the long-term view of the problem.

However, a more pragmatic short-term view should not be overlooked. It would, indeed, be blue-skies thinking to believe that just because those talented people did not go to Europe, their country would develop better. Indeed, first, development is much too complicated a process merely to be related to human resources potential. In a deeply corrupt country, no matter how much good will and drive resourceful people display, any successful initiative could be thwarted by a chain of corruption taking advantage of it and preventing redistribution to the population. Second, these educated people would have left their countries anyway and would have most likely fueled North American competitiveness. Hence, in the short term it definitely makes sense to try to capture the flow of highly skilled immigrants.

Theoretically, the solution is a combination of both helping developing countries to provide the conditions to retain their skilled workforce and trying to capture most of the skilled immigration wave that would leave developing countries anyway.

Conclusion

To conclude on a positive note, ethical recruitment and return migration that accompany the Blue Card demonstrate an attempt to find sustainable solutions to immigration. The idea of a four-year work and residence permit demonstrates the EU’s intention to foster circular and temporary migration that could also benefit developing countries. Having a pragmatic approach is not inconsistent with also contemplating the long-term view and the ethical issues. The main issue will actually remain integration and coordination of European policies. What will indeed become of those efforts if countries persist in considering that immigration and ageing are to be regarded at a national level, as they relates to sovereignty? Efficiency will not be achieved, only coordination of national policies. Ironically, Greg Barrett, Chairman of the American corporation Intel, in a Washington Post article entitled ‘A talent contest we’re losing’, saluted the courage of European politicians and described the Blue Card project as a display of a coordinated and offensive EU

\[16\]

Corruption costs African countries an estimated 25% of their combined national income, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo said – some $148bn a year. (Source: BBC News 17 Feb. 2006).
immigration policy that represents serious competition to the US in their pursuit of competitiveness.\textsuperscript{17}

Appendix – Main sources

European Parliament

On the proposal for a Council directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs
Rapporteur: Ewa Klamt

EIPA (European Institute of Public Administration)

Episcope 2007-3

Demographic Changes, Immigration Policy and Development in the European Union
Author: Dr Katherina-Marina Kyrikeri

Eurostat

- Data in Focus 72-2008: Aging characterises the demographic perspectives of the European societies (Author: Konstantinos Giannakouris)
- Data in Focus 81-2008: Population in Europe 2007: first results (Author: Giampaolo Lanzeiri)
- Data in Focus 27-2008: European Union Labour Force Survey-Annual results 2007 (Authors: Fabrice Romans, Vivian Preclin)

Frontex (European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the member States of the European Union)

General Report 2007

\textsuperscript{17} Greg Barrett, A talent contest we’re losing, 23.12.07, Washington Post. Intel Corp. employs about 2,000 employees with H-1B visas (Green Card) among its 86,000 workers worldwide.
The International Competition for Talent:

Responses to the Increased Demand for Knowledge Migrants

By Janna Miletzki

University College Maastricht

According to the Lisbon Strategy, the EU has the goal of becoming ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world’ by 2010 (Shachar, 2006, p. 139). To attain this goal 700,000 researchers would be needed (Zaletel, 2006). In fact, within developed countries, an increasing demand for highly skilled workers has been observed during the last decades. According to Bauer and Kunze (2004), one reason for the high demand stems from a pronounced technological development in information and communication technology (ICT). Since national supply cannot cover the demand for highly educated workers, labour shortages have often been the result. Skill-biased technological advancement, the ageing of the developed countries’ populations as well as the ongoing process of a broader globalization have prompted more and more countries to relax their migration conditions. Highly skilled migrants are seen as part of the solution. However, it is not only those factors that influence a country’s decision-making. Developments in one country alter other countries’ strategies; each actor reacts to the other’s policies. ‘Human capital’ is becoming an increasingly demanded and thus a scarce resource, leading to a ‘race for talent’. The question arises of why and in what ways different countries have dealt with the quest of attracting highly skilled migrants. The different stakeholders – recipient and source countries as well as companies – should be borne in mind. Who is going to win the race?

Global Economic Causes for an Increasing Migration of the Highly Skilled

Traditionally, the US have been seen as the world’s uncontested ‘IQ magnet’ (Shachar, 2006, p. 105). However, several developments have curtailed the US monopoly on knowledge migrants. To illustrate this, between 2001 and 2003, the number of foreign students going to the US dropped dramatically – 9/11 being one of the reasons. On the other hand, countries such as Canada, Australia, Ireland and the
UK have noted an increase of highly skilled migrants. In fact, these countries have all changed their migration policies in favour of this class of migrants. Kapur and McHale identify three main causes that account for these policy choices (2005), all of which are economic in nature.

First, governments strive for a competitive advantage in knowledge-based industries because of a skill bias in recent technological advancements. As information technology becomes increasingly important, countries experience a short supply of educated people in this area. National education systems do not comply with the increased demand for IT workers. The resulting labour shortages have prompted many countries to admit more skilled foreign workers. In fact, the sectors most important for highly skilled workers are chemical, manufacturing, IT, research and development, and finance (Bauer & Kunze, 2004). According to Kapur and McHale, a policy should be designed in such a way that an ‘immigration surplus’\(^1\) is attained (2005). One way of attaining this, is to promote migration in an unbalanced way, such as focusing either on non-skilled migrants or on highly skilled migrants. However, national economies seem mostly to acquire highly skilled migration since this could, among other benefits, lead to a spillover of knowledge from the immigrants to domestic workers (Kapur & McHale, 2005).

Second, rich-country populations are increasingly ageing. Especially in countries with public pension funds, the need arises for working-age professionals from other countries, who can possibly act as taxpayers. With data from six of the G7 countries, the UN Population Division calculated that until 2050, the number of individuals able to support an elderly person will fall from 5 to 2.5. This means that alternative ways must be found to sustain pension systems. One way is to allow more immigration, which could alleviate part of the burden (Kapur & McHale, 2005).

Third, an international competition for talent has developed out of a broader globalization of production and trade. Contrary to the Heckscher and Ohlin model, it is argued that free trade and capital flows can no longer substitute for labour flows. Furthermore, the GATS (General Agreement on Trade and Services) has promoted a

---

\(^1\) An immigration surplus is the difference between the value of the migrants’ addition to national output and the wages they are paid (Kapur & McHale, p.61).
liberalization of migration alongside its general schemes for trade liberalizations. At the European level, the EU has established the free movement of goods, capital and people, which demonstrates the equal treatment of people and services in international trading terms (Kapur & McHale, 2005). According to Zaletel (2006), increased availability of human capital leads to sustained economic growth.

To sum up, the policy changes towards more knowledge-based migration in several developed countries have been prompted, or rather justified, by economic causes such as labour shortages, ageing of the population and a certain effect of globalization. As can be seen in the following, geo-political relations between countries also play a role.

Reinforcing Policies on Highly Skilled Migration

As Shachar suggests, different countries are reinforcing each other in their task to attract highly skilled migrants. He does not see it as a coincidence that the US, Canada and Australia have all increased their quotas for highly skilled migrants. European countries, too, have introduced initiatives to render immigration of foreign highly skilled workers possible (Bauer & Kunze, 2004). At this point, it should be mentioned that there are several types of migration, with different effects.

On the one hand, there are temporary migration systems that are based on particular job offers. Many countries have also introduced measures that allow migrants to stay permanently. Within these two broad categories, various approaches can be identified: some policies are rather restrictive, others controlled or even competitive in nature. Further differences include numerical limitations, labour market tests and restrictions on the immigration and work of spouses (Lowell, 2005). Papademetriou and O’Neil (2004) add classifications such as employment-based categories, points systems and filtration systems.

As Kapur and McHale point out, all the countries they mention, namely Australia, Canada, the US, the UK and Germany offer temporary work visas. On a global scale, much attention is given to the US H-1B visas that offer migrants the opportunity to work for a renewable period of three years. This scheme is said to be average on the spectrum from competitive to restrictive (Lowell, 2005). While the H-
1B programme was first envisaged to cover migration on a temporary basis, restrictions were later relaxed in favour of permanent immigration (Kapur & McHale, 2005). Another case of temporary migration is exemplified by Germany, where a ‘Green Card’ programme was introduced in 2000. Being quite restrictive, it allowed up to 20,000 foreign highly skilled workers to be employed for up to five years. Within four years, however, only about 13,000 of such migrants had entered the country, until finally in 2005, a new law came into effect that allowed for permanent settlement of the migrants. Apparently, temporary schemes do not seem to be sufficient in order to attract enough highly skilled migrants.

During the last decades, several countries have introduced measures to admit highly skilled migrants permanently – in addition to temporary schemes. Canada was the first country in 1967 to introduce its highly competitive ‘points system’ that allocated points to the candidates according to specific criteria. The system does not require a particular job offer but is aimed at long-term earnings in the domestic labour market, which are assumed to correlate with human capital attributes (Kapur & McHale, 2005). In several categories, such as education, language proficiency, work experience and age, the applicant has to demonstrate they are able to support the Canadian economy. Migrants and their family members receive a permanent resident status immediately upon arrival (Shachar, 2006).

In response to the Canadian system, Australia installed its own competitive version of a points system in 1973. Similar to in Canada, highly skilled migrants obtain an automatic permanent residence permit. Another country that followed suit is New Zealand; it introduced its version of a points system in 1991. Since 2003, employers can recruit workers from abroad without having to go through the whole bureaucratic procedure.

In order to keep up with those schemes and to become ‘the most knowledge-based’ economy in the world, several European countries have relaxed their regulations. The UK, for instance, installed a points-based system in 2002. Proof of a job offer is no longer required. After a period of four years, the migrants can obtain a permanent residence permit. Germany, too, has opened up its system to permanent citizenship after a period of five years of employment, although a points system has
not been installed (Kapur & McHale, 2005). Interestingly, countries that score relatively high on competitiveness in permanent programmes can be quite restrictive in their temporary programmes (Lowell, 2005).

In comparison, the different countries have consecutively and in response to each other installed ever more attracting conditions for migrants to settle in the specific country. The developments point indeed towards a “talent-for-citizenship exchange” (Shachar, 2006, p.116) that lures migrants to a country with the promise of naturalization. Whereas full citizenship can be obtained in Canada within four years, Australia sets a record with only two required years of residence. The U.S., which at the moment still draws the highest absolute number of knowledge migrants (Zaletel, 2006), is threatened by the competitors’ policies. However, the fact that the US is still quite successful in attracting migrants, suggests that more than macro economic and geo-political factors play a role. In the quest of attracting highly skilled migrants, states are not the only actors. Companies’ strategies and the migrants’ own preferences need to be considered.

**Companies’ Strategies and Migrants’ Preferences**

Next to the state, companies influence the number and ways of how migrants are admitted to a country. Krugman (1994) suggests that companies are even more decisive with regard to international competition than states. Their recruitment strategies imply that they are the ones determining who can and cannot work. This is of particular importance in countries with a system that depends on specific job offers. In countries with high quality universities and a high number of foreign students, companies may choose to employ the graduates directly (Lowell, 2005). Thus, applicants who want to come to a country just to work may have less chance of being employed. Often, companies do not actively recruit internationally but merely advertise a vacancy online to which individuals apply (Pethe, 2004).

Companies’ choices also depend on the question of whether foreign employees are seen as complements to or substitutes for domestic workers (Winkelmann, 2002). If they are regarded as complements, less people may be taken than if they are seen as substitutes. However, even when functioning as a substitute, the company often has to prove there is no domestic worker who could take the job offer.
The migrants themselves do not only look at ‘hard’ legal factors but orient themselves towards ‘soft’ factors as well. Quality of life, as well as language and the presence of educational opportunities play a major role in their decisions (Zaletel, 2006). If the state wants to be effective in attracting highly skilled foreign migrants, it has to take regional conditions and cultural differences into account.

Policies in the Countries of Emigration

The receiving countries cannot be the only ones considered in this ‘game’. The sending countries also have their say in this matter. Whereas for a long time those countries were viewed as suffering a brain drain, today brain circulation or even brain gain are spoken of. In the past, most countries have regarded exiting citizens as now being part of their new country of residence. However, with the change of policies in receiving countries, emigration countries have adapted and now seek their own benefits: when former residents attain citizenship in another country, the sending countries often allow dual citizenship in order to retain the link. What is more, they try to attract their citizens back to the country of origin, expecting them to reinvest ‘at home’ (Shachar, 2006). Countries that have been quite successful in this aspect are Korea and Taiwan. While actively promising compensation to those who return, Ireland’s boosting economy, e.g. has attracted back some of its emigrating workers. In addition, increased taxes for emigrants as well as flows of remittances to family members who stayed behind can benefit the source countries (Kapur & McHale, 2005).

Nevertheless, the situation does not seem to be too positive for all the actors involved and raises ethical questions. First, only a fraction of those leaving the country eventually return. With regard to India, e.g. it is often the more competent graduates who leave the country because the government is promoting the lower ‘castes’ in an affirmative action programme (Ashwini, 2005). Of those who left, many find a new home abroad. When the family ‘at home’ can support itself, remittances are not always a consequence. Second, the schemes by receiving and source countries only affect highly skilled migrants. All other workers or persons with a lower score on the points system cannot benefit from either work, residence or citizenship benefits from either side (Kapur & McHale, 2005). Third, highly skilled migrants
themselves are increasingly seen as ‘human capital’ that can be reinvested anywhere in the world given sufficient economic and legal incentives. How far humans can be induced to move and circulate between countries, e.g. in order to fill labour shortages, will become clear in the future. All in all, it has become apparent that temporary migration schemes do not really satisfy migrants’ needs to establish a new home abroad. International talented individuals need reassurance and a set of benefits in order to consider settling in one country or another.

**Conclusion**

The reasons for developed countries to attract highly skilled migrants are manifold. Economic factors certainly account for their need to recruit workers from other, mostly developing, countries. Labour shortages, the common ageing of the population as well as a deepening globalization contribute to the necessity of admitting non-nationals to the domestic workforce. However, the international competition for talent develops out of the receiving countries’ mutual concern for getting their ‘share’ of the migration streams. During the past decades, they have thus introduced policies that have steered towards facilitation of obtaining the country’s permanent residence and even citizenship. However, companies and migrants’ preferences also play a role; policies need to take their needs into account. Moreover, both the recipient and the source countries take part in the race. Source countries want to maximize their benefits by trying to reintegrate emigrants or to let them support their economies. This international competition raises ethical concerns because it only applies to one specific sort of migration. Talented individuals seem more valuable than ever and countries have to relax their restrictions more and more in order to attract them. Who is going to win the race? At the moment, it is not one specific actor – retaliating migration schemes are shifting the balance from one country to another. Both recipient and source countries, as well as companies and, of course, the migrants themselves are gaining their share. The race for talent has become a multi-actor game.
References


Previous Discussion Papers:

David E. Bloom and David Canning,
“Global demography: fact, force and future”,
No. 2006/1

David E. Bloom, David Canning, Michael Moore and Younghwan Song,
“The effect of subjective survival probabilities on retirement and wealth in the United States”,
No. 2007/1

Glenda Quintini, John P. Martin and Sébastien Martin,
“The changing nature of the school-to-work transition process in OECD countries”,
No. 2007/2

David Bell, Alison Bowes and Axel Heitmueller,
“Did the Introduction of Free Personal Care in Scotland Result in a Reduction of Informal Care?”,
No. 2007/3

Alexandre Sidorenko,
“International Action on Ageing: Where Do We Stand?”,
No. 2007/4

Lord Adair Turner of Ecchinswell,
“Population ageing or population growth: What should we worry about?”,
No. 2007/5

Isabella Aboderin and Monica Ferreira,
“Linking Ageing to Development Agendas in sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges and Approaches”,
No. 2008/1

United Nations Population Fund (Ed.),
“The Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing: Where Are We Five Years Later?”,
No. 2008/2

Svend E. Hougaard Jensen and Ole Hagen Jørgensen,
“Low Fertility, Labour Supply, and Retirement in Europe”,
No. 2008/3

Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason,
“Fertility, Human Capital, and Economic Growth over the Demographic Transition”,
No. 2008/4

Asghar Zaidi and Alexandre Sidorenko,
“Features and Challenges of Population Ageing using the European Perspective”,
No. 2008/5

David E. Bloom, David Canning, Günther Fink and Jocelyn E. Finlay,
“The High Cost of Low Fertility in Europe”,
No. 2008/6

Robert L. Clark, Naohiro Ogawa, Makoto Kondo and Rikiya Matsukura,
No. 2008/7

Previous Letters:

Ariela Lowenstein,
“The Israeli experience of advancing policy and practice in the area of elder abuse and neglect”,
No. 2007/1

Jeffrey L. Sturchio & Melinda E. Hanisch,
“Aging and the challenge of chronic disease: do present policies have a future?”,
No. 2007/2

Summary of a Special Session with: Bengt Jonsson (chair), Michaela Diamant, Herta Marie Rack and Tony O’Sullivan,
“Innovative approaches to managing the diabetes epidemic”,
No. 2007/3

Baroness Sally Greengross
“Human Rights Across the Generations in Ageing Societies”,
No. 2008/1

Marie F. Smith
“The Role of Lifelong Learning in Successful Ageing”,
No. 2008/2